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Abstract 
 
BEAU MICHAEL BETTIGA: TRADE POLICY FORMATION IN EUROPE: 
DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE EU-15 STATES AND THE CEE NEW MEMBER 
STATES 
 
Trade preference formation has been the deciding factor in the process of creating and reforming 
the Common Agricultural Policy. The process of reforming the policy created a discrepancy 
between the benefits received by the original European Union-15 member states and the late 
accession central and eastern European new member states. This paper analyses how trade 
preferences have shaped the reforms of the CAP and how the CAP has been poorly implemented 
in the late accession states. Poland will be used a case study to analyze how the CAP has been 
poorly formed in regards to late accession states’ needs because the diverse agricultural structure 
in Poland can demonstrate several interesting challenges the late accession states faced when 
implementing the CAP. The project found that the CAP was poorly implemented in Poland 
because direct payments to farmers were being used for consumption needs and not additional 
investment, the additional measures included in the policy to encourage sustainable farming and 
rural development forced Poland to invest money in nonproduction-stimulating measures, and 
Poland and other late accession states did not have the administrative capacity to implement the 
complex measures of the CAP effectively. 
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Introduction 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Iron Curtain, the European 
Union offered an opportunity for the countries freed from Soviet influence. These countries, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Bulgaria, were interested in the possibility of closer economic and political ties with Europe. At 
the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, conditions and requirements for accession were 
announced for the potential new member states. The Council declared that potential new 
members must be able and willing to take on the political, economic, and monetary challenges of 
joining the European Union.1  
For these former communist states, being able to fulfill the requirements of membership 
in the European Union meant that significant structural changes needed to be made, and there 
were many obstacles in the way on the path to accession because the EU was shaped by original 
member states for their needs and not the CEE-NMS. The agricultural structures of the CEE-
NMS were different from the family based farming prevalent in the EU-15 because of the 
historically feudal nature of agriculture in these states and the process of collectivizing 
agriculture into large farms under communist rule. The Common Agricultural Policy, a system of 
price-supporting subsidies and supplementary income payments, was designed primarily for the 
family farm structure of the EU-15, and the policy needed to be reformed several times by the 
EU-15 to prepare for the accession of the central and eastern European new member states 
(CEE-NMS).  The CEE-NMS have had problems implementing a policy not primarily designed 
for their needs, and the reforms made to the policy in order to lessen the budgetary costs of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gorton, Matthew, Carmen Hubbard, and Lionel Hubbard. "The Folly of European Union Policy Transfer: Why the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Does Not Fit Central and Eastern Europe." Regional Studies 43.10 (2009): 
1305-317. EBSCOHost. Web. 2 May 2016, 1306 
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accession were compromised by the preferences of the EU-15 countries in charge of reforming 
the policy and the lack of leverage in negotiations of the CEE-NMS.2  
 Integration with the EU was the goal for these potential member states. Successful 
integration to the EU requires that connections between domestic elites in already entrenched 
member states and the domestic elites in potential member states be formed to share information 
and experiences.3 Emulation is also a way that these potential member states could build 
compatible domestic institutions with the existing institutions within the other member states. 
Another way that integration was possible was through the convergence of countries through 
harmonization. Involvement in supranational and intergovernmental organizations and 
institutions allowed potential member states to cooperate and develop relationships with the 
already entrenched member states. Involvement in NATO was an opportunity for the former 
Soviet satellite states to begin relationships with the EU members through common defense 
goals. Finally, the last way integration could occur was through the process of penetration, the 
requiring of potential member states to conform to the already existing regulations of the EU.4  
 In the case of the CEE countries, institutions needed to be changed from the post-Soviet 
structure to a structure more aligned with EU policies. Emulation occurred in two forms, legal 
and practical emulation.5 Since CEE countries applying for membership to the EU were in an 
inferior negotiation position to the already unified member states, candidate countries have had 
little to no influence over the development of EU policy and institutions. The process of 
emulation in the CEE countries was attempting to recreate institutions created with the needs of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gorton, Hubbard, and Hubbard, 1306 
3 Gorton, Hubbard, and Hubbard, 1307 
4 Gorton, Hubbard, and Hubbard, 1307 
5 Gorton, Hubbard, and Hubbard, 1307 
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the Western European member states in mind.6 Large chunks of EU law were rapidly applied 
within the CEE states, dodging the domestic legislative procedures and becoming law. Policies 
such as the Common Agricultural Policy were created by Western European states for their own 
agricultural needs. The CAP is characterized by a series of regulations regarding the level of 
production of products, direct payments, and rural development. Since there are so many rules 
regarding the CAP, penetration occurs during the emulation process because of the forced 
implementation of an external policy created to address the needs of a group of countries 
structurally different from the CEE states.7  
 In Western Europe, the systems of agriculture historically have been built upon the 
concept of the family farm. Peasants in Western Europe were able to move freely and buy or sell 
land. Children inherited their parents’ farms and could choose their partner in marriage.8 In the 
CEE countries, peasants became tied to the land and developed into serfs. The structure of 
agriculture was not family based but was rather organized in large, plantation style estates with 
the laborers attached to land and devoid of rights.9 The system of serfdom continued relatively 
uninterrupted for three centuries. During the 19th century, the varying forms of serfdom in each 
CEE country were abolished, but the structure of the systems remained. There were few 
opportunities for newly liberated peasants to find employment outside of the farm, and the 
allotment of land to the peasants was meager and impoverishing. Access to credit was scarce, 
and the few forms of credit available rested in the hands of the former masters of the peasants.10 
Serfdom ultimately was ended, but the legacy of large farms remained.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Gorton, Hubbard, and Hubbard, 1307 
7 Gorton, Hubbard, and Hubbard, 1307 
8 Swain, Nigel. "Agriculture ‘East of the Elbe’ and the Common Agricultural Policy." Sociol Ruralis Sociologia 
Ruralis 53.3 (2013): 369-89. EBSCOHost. Web. 2 May 2016.371 
9 Swain, 371 
10 Swain, 371 
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 With this history of agricultural structuring in mind, CEE countries transformed their 
systems of agricultural four different times in 20th century.11 The first round of reforms occurred 
after World War I when some of the large estates were dismantled into smaller farms and 
allocated to peasants. For example, farms above 50 hectares in size constituted 48% of the total 
area of Polish farms. After World War I, farms above 50 hectares in size only amounted for 
25.8% of the total area of Polish agriculture.12 After World War II, peasants and communists 
called for more drastic reforms of the agricultural structures, but a new system of peasant 
farming was barely implemented before the concept of collectivization appeared on the agenda 
of CEE states. In the late 1940’s, pressure for collectivization began and the process was started. 
The 1950’s saw a temporary break in the process of collectivization, but the pressure returned by 
the end of the decade. By the 1960s, collectivization had occurred in the now Soviet satellite 
states with the exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia, two states which quit on the collectivization 
process after the death of Stalin because of the involvement native communists who rejected 
many aspects of the Stalinist system.13 Over the 20th century, the large, plantation style estates 
went through a dramatic period of reform, but the farms ultimately developed into large, 
collective farms with better compensated workers.14 This system of large farms differed from the 
smaller, family farms in Western Europe, and this agricultural structure continued until the fall of 
the Soviet Union.  
The implementation of the CAP can be argued to have fit poorly with the needs of the 
CEE-NMS in addition to the structural differences between agriculture in the EU-15 and the 
CEE-NMS. There are three main reasons why the CAP is not designed in correlation with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Swain, 371 
12 Swain, 372 
13 Davies, Norman. God's Playground. A History of Poland, Volume II: 1795 to the Present. Oxford: Oxford U, 
2005. Print. 437 
14 Swain, 372 
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needs of the CEE-NMS. The first reason is that EU-15 policy preferences have driven the 
development of the CAP over time. The second reason that the equalization of the rural 
development pillar of the CAP has forced much needed CAP funds to go to other, nonproduction 
stimulating projects. The third and final reason is that the CEE-NMS have struggled to build the 
administrative capacity to implement the measures required by the CAP.  
First, the CAP was designed for the needs of the EU-15 and not the needs of the CEE-
NMS. Swain argues that by extending the CAP beyond the borders of the EU-15, the negative 
aspects of the CAP have been accentuated in the NMS. 15 Most of the CEE-NMS have large, 
formerly state run farms because of collectivization, but Poland and Romania have a more 
diverse farm structure. The CAP was intended to service family farms, but the large amount of 
corporate farms above 100 hectares in size uses up disproportionate percentages of the CAP 
budget for each state. In the Czech Republic in 2010, 68.72 per cent of the budget went to the 
6.18 per cent of farmers in the largest payment categories (over €100,000); in Slovakia the 
proportion was 70.67 and 4.75 per cent. 16 There are very few medium sized family farms in the 
CEE-NMS, so the diversity of farm structure differs significantly from the organization of 
agriculture in the EU-15.  
Secondly, the balancing of both pillars of the CAP has created problems in terms of 
implementing the measures required by both pillars and then the balancing of fund allocation 
between the two. As direct payments were capped by the phasing in process of CEE-NMS for 
the decade following accession, a larger percentage was applied to the second pillar of the CAP. 
As the decade continued, however, the amount of support given through the system of direct 
payments increased. Farmers in the CEE-NMS view the system of direct payments as an income 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Gorton, Hubbard, and Hubbard, 1311 
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support policy, so the use of direct payments as a mode of investing in further capital and 
economic diversification has not occurred.17 The system of direct payments is inhibiting further 
growth of local rural economies by limiting investment in further opportunities outside or on the 
farm. In some CEE-NMS countries such as Hungary, the income effect of the direct payments is 
the difference between some farms generating negative or positive income.18 Also, farms with 
diversified products such as livestock can sometimes receive less in terms of direct payments 
than arable farms focused on a single product.  
Finally, there have been problems with CEE-NMS administrative ability to implement 
the rural development pillar of the CAP. Throughout the 1990s, rural development offices under 
each of the CEE-NMS’s Ministries of Agriculture were weak and ineffective.19 CEE-NMS have 
a long history of productionist tendencies, so the agricultural sectors of the CEE-NMS were 
inexperienced with lowering production and focusing on more environmentally friendly produce. 
Also, the protectionist stance of most CEE-NMS Ministries of Agriculture has taken precedence 
over the nongovernment organizations focused on rural development and national 
administrations for environmental protection.20 Most of the pillar 2 funds have been allocated to 
improving the competitiveness of CEE-NMS produce and not economic diversification in rural 
areas, thus continuing the farm-centric focus of the CAP funds. 21The administrative difficulties 
in implementing all aspects of the CAP have been apparent in the lack of interest in the second 
pillar of the policy from these states. 
Throughout the history of the CAP, the EU-15 states have driven the creation and the 
reforms of the policy without the input of the CEE-NMS. When preparing for the eventual 
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accession of the CEE-NMS after the fall of communism, the EU-15 barely reformed the policy to 
better fit the needs of the CEE-NMS and then required the CEE-NMS to accept the 
implementation of agricultural measures that may not have fit the needs of the CEE-NMS. Have 
the EU-15 forced a policy upon the CEE-NMS, a group of countries with a communist history of 
collectivization, that does not fit along their agricultural needs, and, if so, how has this 
implementation of the CAP created negative consequences for the process of agricultural 
development in these new member states? This paper projects that influence of EU-15 
preferences on the development of the CAP over time has created a policy poorly equipped to 
transition to the needs of the CEE-NMS, and Poland will be used as a case study to present 
several examples of how the implementation of the CAP has created negative consequences for 
both the typical large state farm in the CEE-NMS and the small peasant farms present in Poland.  
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Trade Policy 
Society Based Approach 
 In the world of international trade politics, there are many different approaches that can 
be used when attempting to determine why certain policies are formed and why different states 
desire different trade outcomes. These preferences of individual countries can be implemented 
on the global level, in regional agreements, or unilaterally, and the policies created are normally 
the product of intense negotiation from all participants in the process. There are two approaches 
that can be used in general to explain how various interactions at the domestic level shape the 
preferences of the industries and the states. These two approaches, a society based approach and 
a state based approach, attempt to explain how the various actors in trade agreements such as 
governments, businesses, and labor, interact with each other to create the preferences of the 
nation as a whole.22  
 A society based approach to understanding trade policy formation and trade preferences 
argues that governments trade policy objectives are shaped by politicians’ responses to interest 
group demands. For example, the European Union’s reluctance to liberalize European agriculture 
reflects EU policymakers’ responses to the demands of European farmers. 23A society centered 
approach emphasizes the interplay between organized societal interests and political institutions. 
One of the main aspects of a society based approach is the recognition that international trade has 
income distribution effects on the participants in the trade agreement. When trade is liberalized, 
there will always be some actors who gain from the trade and some actors who lose. Since trade 
has distributional consequences for the participants, net winners and losers from trade 
competition battle in political arenas to advance their specific interests such as protection for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Oatley, Thomas H. International Political Economy. New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008. Print. 71 
23 Oatley, 71 
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farmers in the EU.24 Organizations such as trade associations pressure politicians for more 
controls on imports and other forms of protection, and after a while these organizations start to 
group together to make protectionist coalitions. In most cases the reverse happens as well with 
pro-liberalization coalitions forming out of associations interested in liberalizing trade.  These 
contrasting trade associations and nongovernment organizations use their collective influence to 
push their trade agendas into legislation and policy. 25The methods these groups take to represent 
their interests depend on the political institutions and framework of the country in which they are 
operating.  
Since a society approach is dependent on interest group demands, attention must be 
brought to the source, content, and methods of their demands. The goal of a society based 
approach is to be systematic in determining the preferences and actions of the trade associations 
and other representative nongovernment bodies.26 For this approach to be systematic, it derives 
trade policy preferences from trade’s distributional effects on individual incomes. Trade raises 
some incomes and lowers others, doing so very predictably, and these income consequences 
determine trade preferences since engagement in trade is the distributing factor in regard to 
incomes. There are two main models that can be used to determine participants’ preferences in 
trade policy: the factor and the sector models.  
The two models agree that raising and lowering tariffs redistributes income, and they 
agree that income consequences are the source of trade preferences. The models differ, however, 
on how trade income consequences divide society. The factor model argues that trade politics are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Oatley, 71 
25 Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia Da. "Emerging Powers in WTO Negotiations: The Domestic Sources of Trade Policy 
Preferences." The International Trade Journal 27.5 (2013): 431-49. EBSCOHost. Web. 3 May 2016. 433 
26 Oatley, 72 
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driven by competition between factors of production: capital and labor.27 These two factors can 
be represented in two distinct societal groups of laborers and capitalists. These two factors have 
distinct trade policy preference because trade’s income effects divide society along these two 
factor lines. Whenever tariffs are lowered or raised, one factor’s income increases while the other 
factor’s income falls.28 Since trade can be the deciding factor in how the two factors’ incomes 
are determined, trade requires the two factors to be in constant opposition to each other. Not all 
countries are endowed with the same amount of labor and capital, so the abundant factor benefits 
from liberalized trade while the scarce factor is harmed. 29 If left interrupted over time, factor 
incomes between two countries engaging in international trade will equalize. In a model that 
simulates trade between the United States and China, the income of American labor and the 
income of Chinese labor will change until the two sides equalize, and the same process will 
occur for capital. This tendency for trade to cause factor prices to converge is known as factor-
price equalization, a term that makes the claim that this process will occur.30  
Trade policy preferences stem from these income effects: the scarce factors want to 
minimize trade and protect their incomes with the abundant factors want to liberalize trade to 
maximize their gains from trade. Normally, scarce factors demand high tariffs to protect 
domestic markets from competitive imports with abundant factors want low tariffs to capture as 
much gain from trade as possible.31 In the factor model, this idea dictates that owners of capital 
prefer liberalization and workers prefer protectionism. Since labor and capital pitted against each 
other in constant competition to influence policy formation, trade politics will forever be divided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Oatley, 73 
28 Blonigen, Bruce, and Jacob McGrew. "Task Routineness and Trade Policy Preferences." Economics and Politics 
26.3 (2013): 505-18. EBSCOHost. Web. 3 May 2016., 505 
29 Blonigen and McGrew, 505 
30 Oatley, 74 
31 Oatley, 74 
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into conflict between workers and capitalists.32 The factor model, however, has a critical 
weakness. An assumption that labor and capital are homogenous is required for the factor model 
to be applied. It is obvious, however, that there are many different subgroups that could see 
varying income consequences from the distributive effects of trade.33   
The other model used to explain how trade policy and preferences are formed is through 
the sector model. This model argues that trade politics are driven by competition between 
industries, and these different industries have different preferences that divide society along 
separate industries.34 Whenever tariffs are raised or lowered in this model, wages and return to 
capital employed in some industries both rise, where wages and return to capital in some other 
industries both fall. The distributional effects of trade can pit workers and capitalists in one 
industry against workers and capitalists in another industry, creating conflict between industries.  
 The sector model makes a substantially different assumption about factors in comparison 
to the factor model. The sector model argues that factor mobility, the ability of labor and capital 
to change from one industry to another, is not easily moved between industries.35 In the factor 
model, labor and capital can switch industries easily, leaving the disadvantaged industries to 
industries better suited to capitalize on a state’s endowment. In a system where factors are 
extremely mobile, factor endowments are important in determining the incomes of both labor 
and capital. The sector model argues that factors are inherently tied to their respective industries 
and cannot easily move between different industries.36 For example, it may be difficult for a 
worker to change jobs because of geographic, economic, social, or educational considerations.  
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33 Oatley, 76 
34 Blonigen and McGrew, 505 
35 Blonigen and McGrew, 506 
36 Blonigen and McGrew, 506 
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Since these factors are unable to change industries easily, the distributive effects of trade 
have the same effects on both labor and capital within a particular industry. For example, when 
the demand for European agricultural products falls, the demand for European labor and capital 
both fall as well because capital used in agriculture cannot easily be repurposed into capital in a 
different industry. When these factors have low mobility and industries are competing for access 
to trade policy formulation, workers and capitalists will not unite across industry lines.37 Instead, 
members of the same industry will find common cause to unite for the same change to trade 
policy. An industry with abundant factors will unite to push for trade liberalization while an 
industry with scarce factors will try to increase protectionist trade policies.38 There is no class 
conflict present in the sector model but rather competition between industries.  
As each country has a different endowment of capital and labor, the sectors or industries 
with the abundant factors are considered to be export oriented sectors. These sectors desire to 
introduce their abundant products into other domestic markets to compete for a larger percentage 
of market shares.39 On the other hand, sectors or industries with scarce factors are known as 
import-competing sectors. These industries are vulnerable to competition from foreign products 
produced in a country with more abundant factors in that industry, and these industries clamor 
for protection against these cheaper imports. The sector model accounts for more complex 
interactions on the international level. The factor model contrasts labor and capital while the 
sector model frames countries that export products against industries that are vulnerable to 
foreign competition. The difference between the two models is the fluidity of labor and capital to 
move between industries. 
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The process of forming individual preferences into policy is complicated and can run 
across several difficulties. One of the first problems in translating preferences into trade policy is 
the collective action problem. Collective action problems are when groups that would normally 
unite to push for a common trade policy struggle to achieve complete involvement by the factor 
or the industry. The phenomenon that drives the collective action problem is the issue of free 
riding which occurs when members of a factor or industry depend on other members to shoulder 
the costs of a policy or program which the unpaying member utilizes to their benefit.40 The issue 
of free riding is more prevalent in larger groups such as labor or consumers. These groups have 
common objectives, and they must pool together their resources to be able to reach them. The 
issue, however, is that the size of the group weakens the importance of the contributions from 
each individual member.41 Whether or not one person contributes to the common objective is not 
going to deter the objective from being reached.  
The problem with collective action changes in degree depending on the size of the group. 
In these larger groups, the incentive structure is shaped to encourage free riding, and this 
incentive applies to all the members. Everyone in the group will conclude that their contribution 
is null to the reaching of the objective, and thus no one contributes, resulting in the failure to 
reach the common goal.42 Several conclusions can be drawn about trade policy formation 
through the collective action problem.  
First, small groups of producers tend to dominate trade politics because of the importance 
of each firm’s contribution to the whole. A single firm’s lack of involvement can jeopardize the 
entire industry’s common goal, so the incentive to free ride is drastically reduced.43 Next, 
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producers tend to prefer protectionism at the cost of consumers through the raising of tariffs. 
Only a small number of firms and individuals benefit from a high trade tariff, and consumers are 
forced to carry the costs of the tariffs through the protected prices of the domestic industry 
because producers drive trade politics. Finally, governments are reluctant to liberalize trade 
absent of a reciprocal agreement with another country. Multilateral trade policies open foreign 
markets to export-oriented industries in both countries.44 There is another approach to trade 
policy formation that differs substantially to the processes outlined in the society based approach. 
State Based Approach 
 The society based approach explains the interactions between factors and their trade 
policy preferences, but there are situations where the society based approach fails to explain 
trade conflicts. An example of one of these situations is when two competing exporting firms are 
competing for a share of the global market for their product.45 Rather than focusing on a 
government’s use of tariffs to protect disadvantaged domestic producers, the state based 
approach focuses on the government’s use of subsidies to assist export producing firms 
competing in the global market. This state centered approach dictates that politicians operate 
independently from restricted interest group preferences in pursuit of some greater objective that 
may or may not improve society’s aggregate welfare.46  
 There are two common assumptions that constitute a state centered approach to trade 
policy formation: there are certain conditions where protectionism can benefit society within a 
country and there are situations where governments operate independent of interest group 
involvement in politics.47 In these situations, individual agendas of politicians drive the 
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formulation of trade policies rather than the preferences of specific interest groups. The state 
based approach takes these two assumptions and combines them to state that there are situations 
when governments intervene in the domestic economy through policy measures such as tariffs 
and subsidies in order to improve society. 48 
 One example of a situation when government intervention can improve aggregate social 
welfare and operate independently of interest group involvement is in the cases of infant-industry 
protection. This case dictates that there are situations where new firms will not be initially 
efficient but will gain efficiency and productivity over time.49 These situations determine that 
government protection in the short term can improve societal benefit over the long term as the 
infant industry develops. Normally, there are two explanations why new industries may not be 
successful in the short run. Economies of scale and economies of experience are two 
phenomenon that influence the ability of a firm to be efficient immediately. Economies of scale 
occur when the cost of producing a unit falls as more units are produced. Initial products will be 
expensive, but the cost burden falls as the firm produces more goods.50 Economies of experience 
occur when the production of a specific good requires skills and knowledge that can only be 
gained through experience with the production of the good. This knowledge will not be present 
in a new firm, and these skills will take time to develop. The cost of production will fall as the 
workers gain the skills required to produce the good efficiently.51 These two explanations 
demonstrate why firms may be unsuccessful in the short term but can be efficient in the long 
term when paired with government protection. 
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 When a situation arises where an infant firm can benefit society by being protected by 
government measures, the policies chosen to protect the targeted industry are referred to as 
industrial policy. Industrial policy includes various instruments of protection such as tax policy, 
subsidies, and tariff with the goal of incentivizing the movement of capital and labor to 
potentially more lucrative industries. 52 Rather than responding to short term demands from 
interest groups and coalitions, a state acts normally with a long term objective in mind such as 
improved economic growth, efficiency, and productivity. Normally, these long term objectives 
are created by a country’s desire to compete in a specific market with already established foreign 
firms.53 Developing countries use industrial policy in an attempt to recreate the conditions for 
success in already advanced economies. In these situations, the state’s decision to intervene in 
trade can potentially improve the overall welfare of society. 
 Not all countries are equally effective at implementing successful industrial policies. 
Each state has a different political framework that may either assist or harm efforts to build 
successful industrial policies. The ability of a state to successfully protect its policymakers from 
the short term preferences of interest groups and coalitions is defined as state strength.54  Some 
states have strong central governments that operate independently of private interests while other 
states have decentralized authority that provides multiple channels for interest groups to impact 
trade policy decisions. Strong states can plan with the long term welfare of society in mind while 
weak states struggle to create a long term plan in the face of interest group involvement.55 Also, 
stronger states find it easier to remove instruments of protection once the infant industry has 
gained enough efficiency through economies of scale and economies of efficiency to compete on 
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the global market. A strong state is better able to improve society through having the freedom to 
operate with the best interest of society in consideration. 
 A state centered approach focuses on the beneficial role states can play in shaping 
international trade policy, there are several criticisms of the approach. One of the biggest 
weaknesses of the approach is the assumption that states will always act in the best interest of 
society.56 In many cases, there are no incentives for national policymakers to behave in ways that 
benefit society, particularly in situations where a state an autonomous head of state. There is 
currently not a sufficient explanation offered in the state based approach. Also, the idea that 
states are completely insulated from domestic pressures such as interest groups is not entirely 
correct. It would be completely impossible to fully insulate policymakers from domestic 
preferences of interest groups or factors. A society based approach is too generous in its 
assumption of interest group involvement while a state based approach is too restrictive in its 
explanation of how interest groups can be involved in the policy formation process.57 These two 
weaknesses in a state based approach demonstrate that a combination of a society based 
approach and a state based approach would provide the most accurate representation of how 
trade policies are formed.  
Agricultural Trade Policy Formation 
 As Jensen and Mi Jeong Shin state in their article, “Globalization and Domestic Trade 
Policy Preferences: Foreign Frames and Mass Support for Agriculture Subsidies,” agricultural 
trade negotiations have always taken an imperative place in international trade politics.58 
Negotiations over agriculture are considered to be one of the key reasons for why there is 
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currently some international trade deadlock. There is not complete interest in reforming 
agricultural trade policy and liberalizing trade in agricultural products because developed 
countries around the world have consistently shown support for protectionist measures in 
agricultural trade. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the following Doha Round of 
trade negotiations have attempted to fix the issue of agricultural protection around the globe, but 
the industry remains highly protected.  For example, the European Union agricultural protection 
amounts to 22% of gross farm receipts, higher than the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) average for its members.59 
 There are two main reasons that economists use when demonstrating why agriculture is 
more protected relative to other industries. First, economists have pointed out that the economic 
structure within is a country is important in determining whether or not agriculture is protected. 
Secondly, economists emphasize the ability of farmers to surpass the collective action problem 
better than consumers. 60 The collective action problem cannot completely explain the 
widespread nature of agricultural protection in advanced countries because countries with 
varying political institutions and agricultural preferences still result with similar forms of 
protection for agriculture. Democracy and elections for policymakers play important roles in the 
development of agricultural policy, but the many variations of democracy and electoral rules do 
not effectively explain the commonality of agricultural policy across these advanced states.61  
 For the Common Agricultural Policy in particular, a combination of aspects from both the 
society-based approach to trade policy formation and the state-based approach to trade policy 
formation are present. Farmers constitute one of the most powerful interest groups in the EU, and 
their ability to overcome the collective action problem when there are upwards of 172 million 
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farmers working in the EU today is remarkable.62 Farmers exercise considerable influence in 
national and supranational politics because of the importance of the agricultural sector and 
farmers’ ability to organize. The society-based approach use the sector model to explain how the 
CAP is concerned with providing income support to all farmers, including both the large, 
efficient farms with plenty of capital and smaller, capital-needy farms. In this case, both large, 
corporate producers and small, family farms benefit from the protection introduced through the 
CAP. The sector model also efficiently explains specific member states’ preferences in regards to 
the formulation and reform of the CAP, and the Franco-German relationship is strong example of 
how two states can have differing preferences. France is one of the leading agricultural powers in 
the world, and French preferences in EU negotiations over the Agenda 2000 have continually 
shown a French interest in resisting the trade liberalization preferences of other member states 
such the United Kingdom.63 Germany on the other hand is one of the leading industrial powers in 
the world, and along with the United Kingdom is one of the largest net contributors to the CAP. 
The CAP uses subsidies to benefit French agriculture at the expense of the non-agricultural 
industries in net contributors to the policy, demonstrating the competition across industry lines as 
explained through the sector model of the society-based approach.  
The state-based approach explains why the CAP was originally implemented. In the wake 
of World War II, Europe needed to rebuild its economic sector to be able to provide a consistent 
food source while protecting farmers from threatening international competition.64 After the 
devastation of infrastructure, population, and societal organization, recreating a successful 
agricultural sector in Europe was imperative to the reconstruction of the continental economy. 
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French policy preferences again became important in the development of the EEC and the CAP. 
State intervention in the agricultural sector allowed for French and European farmers to sell their 
produce at prices above what they would get in a liberal market. This allowed additional income 
to be invested in the farm while also implementing better forms of farm production because of 
the incentive structure of the CAP that pushed farmers to maximize production in order to 
maximize their returns from the subsidies65. In this quasi-infant industry case, state intervention 
allowed for the protection of a recovering industry. The state based approach does not explain 
the continued use of the CAP after the initial recovery period, however, so the sector model of 
the society based approach does a better job of accommodating the ability of farmers to influence 
policy makers and continue the protectionist policy for such a long period of time.  
Gerry Alons in his paper, “European External Trade Policy: The Role of Ideas in German 
Preference Formation,” makes the argument that both internal and external pressures drive the 
preference formation of individual member states of the European Union.66 Internal pressures for 
member states of the European Union are represented in the political, economic, and ideational 
forces within the state. External pressures can be long standing international relationships 
between states such as the Franco-German relationship or United States trade liberalization 
demands.67 In most of the previous literature, emphasis has been placed on the importance of 
political and economic considerations in the development of trade policy. There are situations, 
however, where a political or economic explanation cannot accurately portray the complete 
policy formation process. In these situations, ideas such as national or regional identity can 
influence the development of trade policy. In the European Union and particularly France, for 
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example, a historical understanding that the well-being of farming and farmers is imperative to 
the success of continent is one of the aspects in the formulation of the Common Agricultural 
Policy.68 
For the EU-15 states, access to additional funds through the CAP over decades has 
created an advanced agricultural sector with large, exporting farms mixed with productive family 
farms. Depending on the country, the constitution of the agricultural sector can vary from 
primarily family based farms in France to large, industrial farms in the United Kingdom. Since 
most of the large farms were overproducing under the price-supporting measures of the CAP that 
existed before the shift to a system of direct payments, a reform of the CAP was needed, and the 
EU-15 states took the opportunity to implement their policy preferences before enlargement of 
the EU.69 As the CEE-NMS prepared for accession, the budget concerns of implementing the 
price-supporting measures for both the large, formerly collectivized farms and the small and 
numerous peasant farms in these new member states projected to be unbearable for the net 
contributors in the EU-15.70 Rather than extend a policy that was relatively unneeded by 2004 to 
the CEE-NMS and risk increasing the cost of the CAP by extreme proportions, the EU-15 
decided to completely decouple the CAP from production subsidies and towards income support 
while introducing increased spending on rural development and environmentally sustainable 
farming practices. Without considering the needs of the CEE-NMS, the EU-15 implemented a 
reform that fit well with encouraging investment in agriculture in their countries without 
planning for how the system of direct payments would be used in the CEE-NMS.71 Also, the EU-
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15 forced the CEE-NMS to accept a substantially smaller percentage of CAP funds, thus further 
enlarging the disparity between the support received by EU-15 states and the CEE-NMS.  
For the CEE-NMS, economic and political considerations are a driving force in the 
development of their trade policy preferences. Almost all of the CEE-NMS prefer a continuation 
of the budget of the CAP while resisting the renationalization of agricultural policy.72 Most of 
the CEE-NMS are beneficiaries of the CAP because of the developing nature of the agricultural 
sector in many of these growing economies. Also, many of these states are against further 
“greening” of the CAP, requiring a percentage of the direct payments given to individual farmers 
to go towards implementing sustainable farming practices, because they fear that agricultural 
production could be compromised in their still developing sector.73 Environmental concerns are 
not as important in the CEE-NMS as they are in the EU-15 because the CEE-NMS are more 
concerned with closing the gap between the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU-15 and 
themselves. Policy preferences of the CEE-NMS differ from the EU-15 because there is a 
discrepancy in the level of development between the agricultural sectors of the two groups, and 
the CEE-NMS have used their leverage in CAP reform negotiations to project these preferences 
into the policy, demonstrating the importance of farmers and the development of their 
agricultural sectors as explained through the society based approach to trade policy and trade 
policy preference formation.  
 These two differing trade policy preferences and the advantaged positon of the EU-15 in 
the formation of the CAP have created a natural disparity between the levels of support received 
in the EU-15 states and the CEE-NMS. Not only are the amount of funds received by the EU-15 
drastically more than the funds allocated to the CEE-NMS, but the focus of the CAP is not 
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particularly geared towards the preferences of the CEE-NMS. Rural development and 
environmental concerns are not as much of a priority to the developing CEE-NMS, so the 
implementation of the “greening” of the direct payments and the increased focus on sustainable 
farming measures and off-farm employment opportunities are seen as poorly geared towards 
agricultural sectors that are trying to close the gap in production between themselves and the 
more advanced EU-15. The history of the CAP demonstrates the priority of the preferences of 
the EU-15 states and how they influenced the development of a policy poorly suited to the needs 
of the agricultural sectors of the CEE-NMS. 
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History of the Common Agricultural Policy 
Creation of the CAP 
 After World War II, Europe was completely devastated by the destruction of their 
infrastructure and key industries. One of the industries hit hardest by the turmoil of war was the 
agriculture sector. The years after World War II saw food shortages, and the empty stomachs of 
the population put agricultural policy on the minds of the national leaders invested in the 
European integration project.74 The original members of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) agreed that consistent production of food and stable farming incomes were needed. France 
was particularly invested in increasing agricultural production while protecting farmers because 
the rural communities of France are integral to the France’s national identity. Large and small 
farms alike were on the minds of French policymakers as a comprehensive agricultural policy 
was being negotiated. In exchange for French products joining the new European single market, 
the French received concessions that subsidized their small farmers and guaranteed protection for 
their agricultural exports, demonstrating French policy preferences for protecting the family 
nature of farms.75  
 The Treaty of Rome of 1957 included a common policy for agricultural production. The 
six original members of the EEC, France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and the 
Netherlands, recognized that price levels for agricultural products would differ from country to 
country, so price support measures constituted the main body of what became known as the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).76 Until the 1980’s, the CAP functioned as a price-
supporting policy where the Ministry of Agriculture would set a price level for agricultural 
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products for the given year. The EEC would intervene and buy enough products to ensure that 
dictated price level would stay established, and the Ministry of Agriculture would push the 
products back onto the market if prices rose above the intended level.77 The process for 
determining prices was influenced by the desire to provide a livable income to the poorest 
farmers in the Community. The largest farms took advantage of the policy and maximized 
production, thus maximizing their access to subsidies. The incentive structure was to 
overproduce, and surpluses became the norm for most agricultural products. The EEC had no 
choice but to buy the surpluses and put them in storage, raising the costs of the policy to the EEC 
budget.78  
 The creation of the CAP represented the agricultural policy preferences of the original six 
founding member states, particularly France and Italy. In the wake of World War II, agriculture 
in these states needed subsidies to help stimulate the recovery of European agriculture in the face 
of uncertainty over the ability of Europe to produce enough agricultural produce to fulfill 
demand of EEC consumers. The preferences of the founding members reflect the infant industry 
case as outlined under the state-based approach to trade policy formation. In this case, the 
devastation of World War II created a situation where state intervention through price-supporting 
subsidies can protect the recovering agricultural sector from competition from the unscathed 
agricultural sector of the United States. The policy had the consequence of creating an incentive 
structure for large, efficient farms to overproduce in order to maximize their returns from the 
policy, and the need for reform became clear as the policy aged.  
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Mansholt Reforms 
 Sicco Mansholt, the Commissioner overseeing agriculture in the late 1960’s 
acknowledged that the surpluses were being caused by overproduction from large, efficient 
farms, so he introduced the first attempt at reforming the CAP in hopes of redistributing the large 
farms into smaller, less efficient farms.79 These less efficient farms would not overproduce to the 
same extent as the larger farms, but an economic recession in the 1970s destabilized Mansholt’s 
attempts at reforms. Mansholt failed at reforming the CAP, and the price-supporting measures 
remained because of the considerable political influence of farmers in Europe. These price 
settlements became a huge strain on the now named European Community’s (EC) budget with 
West Germany and Britain, two industrial powers, as the biggest net contributors.80 West 
Germany and Britain’s preferences in regards to the CAP depended on removing the extraneous 
costs attached to the overproduction of agricultural products. As the two biggest contributors to 
the policy who disadvantaged their more competitive industrial sectors by allocating national 
resources towards supporting the CAP, the two countries were interested in creating a 
compromise that allowed farmers to have a stable source of income while limiting the 
unintended additional consequences to the CAP. France, however, was interested in protecting 
the organization of the CAP because the French agricultural sector was the biggest beneficiary of 
the policy. 
 Since Mansholt’s plan failed to reform the CAP, the problem with surpluses continued 
and worsened. Rather than just having the products wasting in storage and adding to the cost of 
the CAP, the EC decided to begin “dumping” these surpluses onto the global market. The CAP 
promised higher prices to EC farmers for their goods than what was offered on the world market, 
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so the EC decided to pay the farmers the difference between what the good sold for on the 
market and the promised price level for the good.81 With so many additional agricultural goods 
on the global market, the prices of the products dropped and influenced competing agricultural 
exporters to introduce their own subsidies in order to successfully compete with these EC 
surpluses. External pressures from competing countries such as the United States finally pushed 
the EC to reform the CAP in the 1980’s.  
 Mansholt’s failed attempts at reform represented the changing policy preferences of the 
new expanded EC. As the cost of the CAP rose dramatically because of the additional costs of 
storing surplus produce, many of the member states’ preferences changed because of the cost of 
the policy. Net contributors such as West Germany were especially invested in reforming the 
CAP because the cost only projected to rise as the policy went forwards. Also, other competing 
countries such as the United States began to implement agricultural subsidies in order to compete 
with the EC dumping surplus produce on the open market. External pressures began to press on 
the EC’s agenda of reform. Changes in the global market led to the ultimate failure of these 
reforms, but it became clear to the member states that reform would be needed in the near future 
as their preferences began to change.  
Reforms of the 1980s 
 In 1984 the EC decided to reform the CAP by introducing a system of quotas for dairy 
products. Four years later, the EC implemented a limit on the price support measures and fixed 
increases in the future at a maximum of 74% of the increase in the Community GDP.82 If there 
was a situation where this maximum was compromised, price cuts for certain products became 
required until the 74% ceiling was no longer compromised. In addition to a price cap, money 
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from the CAP budget was allotted to farmers to incentivize them to place aside land and not use 
it for production.83 These reforms helped limit the surplus problem, particularly in respect to 
dairy products, but these reforms did little to change the fundamental character of the CAP. 
These minor reforms did just enough to curb the rapidly rising cost of the CAP, and the 
restriction of costs demonstrated the policy preferences of the United Kingdom and West 
Germany. These states were particularly interested in limiting the unnecessary costs of the 
policy, and they pushed for the reforms as the cost of the CAP jumped by extremely high 
percentages over several years in the 1980s.  
 The preference adjustment that led to the attempted Mansholt reforms continued to occur 
and pushed the creation of the reforms of the 1980s. Although these measures were relatively 
small and mitigated by the influence of strong member state preferences such as French interests 
in protecting the price-support subsidies given to the family farms that constituted the majority of 
French agricultural structure, the reforms were the beginning of the restriction of the cost of the 
CAP and reflected the influence of new contributing states such as the United Kingdom. These 
reforms set the stage for the gradual progression of the CAP from a price-supporting policy to an 
income supporting policy as the member states realized that the cost of the CAP was becoming 
unbearable. This policy change also demonstrated the growing influence of West Germany in 
trade policy formation as the West Germany economy began to grow into the industrial power 
that is today.  
MacSharry Reforms 
 Commissioner MacSharry, the Irish European Commissioner at the time, introduced a 
new package of reforms in 1991. The “MacSharry Reforms” as they became known as included 
a steep decrease in the prices for beef and cereals, a transition from price-supporting measures to 
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transferring lump sums to directly support agricultural incomes, a retirement scheme geared 
towards encouraging older farmers to retire, and an incentive package to produce more 
environmentally friendly products.84 There were many opponents to the reform that claimed that 
the CAP would be even more expensive because of the new measures, but ultimately the 
MacSharry reforms demonstrated that farmers could be supported through other measures 
besides price-support.  
 By 1991 and 1992, there were four main pressures that pushed the EC towards reforming 
the CAP. First, the budget issues resulting from the CAP resumed after a period of abatement in 
the 1980s because the United States had introduced subsidies for their own agricultural products, 
thus lowering world prices and widening the gap that the CAP had to fill between world prices 
and the adjusted EC price.85 Secondly, Germany reunified after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
adding large amounts of agricultural land that would begin to overproduce their goods because of 
the incentive structure of the price-supporting measures. Thirdly, the newly democratic former 
Soviet satellite states required currency to be able to replenish their stripped industries. The CAP 
did not allow for the importation of central and eastern European agricultural products, thus 
increasing the difficulty of these future member states to accumulate currency with which they 
could buy the capital required to develop their agricultural sectors.86 Finally, the Uruguay Round 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was not making any progress in 
negotiations between the EC and the United States led Cairns Group. By 1992, progress was 
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insufficient and the United States became able to directly negotiate with the EC, pushing 
pressure on them to liberalize trade in agricultural products.87 
 The cost of the CAP has always been a difficult problem for the EC. In the period from 
1974 to 1979, the cost of the CAP rose by a staggering 23%, an increase twice the size of the 
increase in incomes. In the early 1980s, the cost of the CAP stabilized, but in 1983, the CAP’s 
cost skyrocketed by 30%.88 The EC had reached its limit of the cost of the CAP that could be 
provided by EC funding. In order to bypass the limit, all member states had to agree, but the 
British government refused to comply with lifting the limit unless changes were made to the 
CAP. British demands ultimately led to the introduction of the dairy quota in 1984 and the new 
maximum limit on EC spending on the CAP. The ultimate issue of overrunning the budget for 
the CAP continued to plague the EC, and only some imaginative accounting methods helped 
alleviate the short term effects of these overruns.89 The cost of the policy was becoming 
unbearable, and potential enlargement loomed over the CAP as a budgetary problem on the 
horizon. A reunified Germany and the United Kingdom pushed heavily for reforms as the EC 
became aware of just how costly the accession of the future CEE-NMS would be if they received 
access to the price-supporting measures of the CAP. This recognition of added cost was the 
driving force behind the commencement of the “decoupling” of subsidies from agricultural 
production, an important change because of pressure from the United States to liberalize trade 
policy, the mitigation of added costs from the future CEE-NMS attached to subsidizing 
production, and the representation of preferences from agricultural powers such as France to 
continue protecting farmers and their incomes while accommodating the preferences of Germany 
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and the United Kingdom to shift costs from the more unpredictable, skyrocketing production 
subsidies to a safer system of direct transfers.  
 Another issue that drove the reforms of 1991 forward was the accession of the southern 
European states of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The decision to admit these states was primarily 
focused on incentivizing the creation of stable democracies in each of these states after periods 
of dictatorship.90 One consequence of admitting these states was that new demands were now 
placed on the budget of the CAP. These three new states used their pooled leverage to wrestle a 
doubling of structural funds from the EC budget, thus pulling money away from the CAP.91 
Additionally, German reunification added large areas of agricultural land, and these farmers 
gained access to the CAP that incentivized them to overproduce to gain maximum benefit from 
the CAP subsidies. As former communist central and eastern European states began to clamor 
for inclusion and interaction with the EC, the EC members acknowledged that EC membership 
would have to be extended to these states at some point in the future.92 This future enlargement 
created daunting prospects for the cost of the CAP if the policy were to continue forward without 
reform. Enlargement played a key role in driving forward the 1991 reforms of the CAP. 
 Since the incentive structure of the price-support measures of the CAP created situations 
where large, efficient farms attempted to maximize production to receive maximum benefits 
from the subsidies, these large farms pumped their livestock full of growth hormones and laced 
the ground with as many fertilizers and pesticides as possible.93 The strain on the environment 
created a growing concern of the environmental aspects of farming. This newfound focus on 
environmental concerns contrasted the already existing support for farmers in the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 George, Stephen, and Ian Bache. "Enlargement." Politics in the European Union. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2011. 531-50. Print. 531 
91 George and Bache, 374 
92 George and Bache, 374 
93 George and Bache, 374 
35 
	  
Union, and policymakers discovered that there was not as much pushback from the general 
public when it came to agricultural reform. In the late 1980s, several scares about the safety of 
EC food products occurred that pushed support for farmers even lower. The biggest scare was an 
outbreak of mad cow disease that occurred in the United Kingdom around 1992.94 These animal 
welfare, food safety, and environmental concerns became attached to the system of price-support 
and overproduction, and reforming the CAP to change the incentive towards non-damaging 
methods of farming became popular in many EC member states.  
 Finally, many external pressures pushed the EC to consider radically reforming the CAP. 
During the Uruguay Round of the GATT trade negotiations, the United States put the removal of 
agricultural subsidies at the top of its trade agenda, demonstrating the attitude that EC dumping 
of surplus products on the open market hurt the United States and many other countries’ 
agricultural product competiveness.95 When the MacSharry reforms passed into effect in 1992, 
Commissioner MacSharry could then negotiate a deal where the United States and the EC moved 
away from price support subsidies and towards other, non-trade distorting methods of supporting 
farmers. After the talks were concluded and a deal in place between the two agricultural powers, 
another set of talks was opened to further negotiate on agricultural subsidies. The United States 
quickly and unilaterally removed all price-supporting subsidies besides those on cereals and 
livestock as agreed upon in the Uruguay Round, but the EC lagged behind in removing the price-
supporting measures.96 Now the pressure was on the EC to mirror the unilateral subsidy removal 
that the United States had implemented earlier. 
 The four pressures that pushed Commissioner MacSharry to reform the CAP 
demonstrated the influence of the EU-15 on the reform process of the CAP. These four pressures 
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required the CAP to be reformed, and the EU-15 reformed the CAP with their preferences in 
mind even though the EU was going to be rapidly expanded. The EU-15 saw the agricultural 
nature of the CEE-NMS and decided to switch the CAP to a policy that better supported their 
interests. Price-supporting measures were costly and unnecessary because prices in the 
developed EU-15 were relatively stable and the accession of the CEE-NMS would introduce an 
extremely expensive expansion of the EU. The system of direct payments was implemented to 
support farming incomes and encourage investment in agricultural capital by farmers. They did 
not take into consideration how the direct payments would be implemented in the structurally 
different CEE-NMS, and they did not care in the first place. They decided to extend a take it or 
leave it offer to these states and forced the CEE-NMS to prepare for the eventual implementation 
of a policy not created with their interests in mind.  
Fischler Reforms 
 In the face of growing pressure to further reform the CAP, Franz Fischler, the Agriculture 
Commissioner at the time, introduced a new series of reforms in 1995. These reforms aimed to 
finalize the process of decoupling support for farmers from production and then attaching the 
support to further social and environmental goals. These initial steps set the stage for the creation 
of a more complete package of agricultural reform that was to occur in 2000 and 2003 in the face 
of the accession of the former communist central and eastern European states. The MacSharry 
Reforms of 1992 and the Fischler reforms of 1995 did not take into consideration the preferences 
of the CEE-NMS. Rather than include the CEE-NMS, the EU-15 used their leverage as already 
existing member states to create a package of reforms that fit their preferences while demanding 
changes within the CEE-NMS. The CEE-NMS were at a complete disadvantage in negotiations, 
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and this lack of representation of their preferences also showed in the negotiation of the next 
round of reforms.  
Agenda 2000 and Mid-Term Review of 2003 
 Agenda 2000 was the next reform to the CAP as the EU prepared for the eventual 
accession of the central and eastern European former communist states and the Mediterranean 
states of Cyprus and Malta. The reforms to the CAP proposed by the EU were relatively clear. 
Agenda 2000 proposed substantial cuts in supporting prices and shifted compensation into direct 
payments given to individual farmers with a limit set on the amount an individual could 
receive.97 These measures were in line with moving the CAP away from price-supporting 
measures as negotiated with the United States at the Uruguay Round. The Agenda, however, still 
had to survive the negotiation process between individual member states, and France in 
particular had an interest in weakening the strength of the reforms in order to ensure some 
protectionist measures remained. After a rough period of negotiation that included a massive 
demonstration in Brussels by farmers, delays were included in the implementation of the agreed 
upon price cuts for cereals, milk, and beef products. 98 
 France was the driving factor in pushing through delays in the implementation of the 
reforms. Most of the measures included in the Agenda 2000 reform were either only portions of 
what the Ministry of Agriculture proposed or were pushed back through delays for several 
years.99 France was not finished compromising the original package, however, as the French 
President, Jacques Chirac, rejected what the French government had negotiated. Rather than 
compromise their close-knit relationship with France publicly, the German administration of the 
EU introduced further measures to weaken the impact of the Agenda 2000 reforms. An 
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additional period of delay was added to the dairy reforms, and the cereal cuts were reduced 
further beyond the previous agreement percentage.100 The other member states, particularly those 
that were net payers to the CAP, were bought off through the promising other subsidies such as 
increased structural funds. The nature of the Agenda 2000 was compromised by the refusal of the 
French to accept what had previously been negotiated, thus demonstrating the idea that a single, 
powerful member state such as France could use its leverage to implement its policy preferences 
individually into a policy such as the CAP. 
 The Agenda 2000 reform was a continuation of the idea introduced during the 1992 
reforms that the CAP subsidies needed to be decoupled from production measures. In 2001, 
Commissioner Fischler pushed an additional reform through the EU negotiation process that 
simplified the increasing complex system of direct payments for small farmers who would 
receive less than 1,250 euros from the CAP.101 Under this Small Farmers’ Scheme, smaller 
farmers could choose to receive a single flat rate sum based on historical values of the farm. The 
system of flat-rate decoupled payments became further incorporated into the CAP. 
 Single flat rate payments became the answer to the large agricultural sectors of the central 
and eastern European countries that were preparing for accession to the EU. The price-
supporting measures of the CAP dictated that the budget for the policy would be unable to 
support the additional land used for farming in these states. The process of direct payments at 
this time was also exceedingly complicated, and the infrastructure and the governments of the 
states would be unable to effectively gain access to vary degrees of direct payment support.102 
With these concerns in mind, the CAP was further reformed to offer a Simplified Approach 
Payment Scheme (SAPS). Each farmer would receive a flat-rate, decoupled payment that started 
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at 25% of the support given to the already established EU member states.103 The payments would 
be given directly to each state, and the state government would have the freedom to distribute the 
money according to their own needs and agendas. The SAPS system was built to accommodate 
the projected inability of farmers to implement the complex arrangements negotiated into the 
system of direct payments. The SAPS is heavily favored by the CEE-NMS, and their preferences 
in protecting this policy have been demonstrated by these states continual desire to extend the 
length of the SAPS. 
 In 2002, Fischler decided to try to end the production-supporting measures of the CAP in 
its entirety. The Commissioner proposed a reform that called for the complete decoupling of 
agricultural subsidies by the end of 2004.104 The level of money received by the member states 
would be the same as under the Agenda 2000 reforms, but the states would receive the money as 
a lump sum payment. The governments then established their own criteria for distributing the 
funds as long as the funds did not support production stimulating measures. Individual countries 
could use the funds to either appease their large farmers or to encourage agricultural restricting 
along more efficient lines. In order to receive these payments, standards for environmental 
protection, food safety, and animal welfare had to be met. This new system of lump sum 
payments came just in time to secure that the accessing central and eastern European countries 
would be integrated into the same system of agricultural support that the EU-15 would receive 
while also allowing individual countries to distribute the funds according to their differing 
national needs.105  
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 After a lengthy period of negotiation, the Council of Agriculture Ministers reached a 
proposal that satisfied all parties. Fischler’s proposal was adopted in its core form, but the 
implementation of the system of direct payments was delayed until 2005 and member states 
could apply for the continuation of some price-supporting measures until 2007 in the situations 
where famers would cease production without the subsidies.106 After 2007, the full decoupling of 
agricultural support had occurred, and a “health check” of the CAP was measured in 2008. This 
analysis of the state of the CAP concluded that more money was to be distributed to the rural 
development aspects of the CAP while further liberalization of the dairy sector needed to occur 
before the expiration of the milk production quotas in 2015.107  
 The EU-15 barely accommodated the needs of the CEE-NMS, and France hijacked the 
policy reform process as well. The only successful aspect of this reform for the CEE-NMS was 
the creation of the SAPS that eased the issues with the complexity of the direct payment system 
for the CEE-NMS. The delays in the introduction of the complete decoupling of agricultural 
subsidies from price-supporting measures to income-supporting measures demonstrated the 
French interests in protecting their family farms. Not only were the CEE-NMS forced to 
accepted the “phasing-in” of direct payments, the redistribution of more funds to the rural 
development and environmental aspects of the CAP did not represent the preferences of the still 
developing CEE-NMS. These states needed more funds to invest in their agricultural production, 
and rural development and environmental measures were considered to be a less useful way of 
spending CAP funds. The measures agreed upon in the Agenda 2000 and Mid-Term Review of 
2003 reforms reflected the preferences of the EU-15 in protecting their advantaged place in the 
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allocation of CAP funds while creating unintended consequences stemming from the 
implementation of the CAP in the CEE-NMS.  
2013 Reforms 
 In 2013, a new debate over reforming the CAP came into focus as the EU began to 
launch the “Europe 2020” plan that prepared the EU for the challenges that were to come over 
this upcoming period. Starting with a public debate over the CAP that began in 2010, the process 
of reforming the CAP took several twists and turns over a two year period where the exact 
reforms to the policy were to be determined. In October, 2015, a political agreement between the 
member states was reached that outlined the changes that would be made to the CAP.108  
The first reform was the limiting of direct payment disparities between member states. 
The SAPS was extended until 2020, and methods of internal and external convergence between 
values given in direct payments were included. Other measures such as additional payments to 
young farmers and the “greening” of direct payments that required 30% of the direct payment to 
go towards environmental and clean farming practices were included.109 The second area of 
reform was concerned with balancing the market mechanisms of the CAP, particularly the 
ending of the sugar quota and amendments to the single market mechanism of the EU in the face 
of increased competition on the international markets. The third area of reform focused on 
increasing the amount of the subsidies given for encouraging rural development with an 
emphasis on underdeveloped regions of the EU. The fourth and final area of reform established 
increased controls for monitoring the subsidies given by the CAP and the requirements for 
receiving them.110 All of these reforms combined to equalize the system of direct payments while 
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incentivizing clean farming, environmental concerns, and rural development. The CEE-NMS 
preferences showed in the future limiting of direct payment differences between the former EU-
15 states and the CEE-NMS. In exchange for this reduction of direct payments disparities, the 
CEE-NMS agreed to the “greening” of the CAP even though the CEE-NMS are wary of the 
limitations on production imposed by the greening process. Other concessions include increased 
rural development spending, but the CEE-NMS would rather focus on investing those funds in 
more farming-intensive projects. The last concession was the implementation on further controls 
and oversight on how the CAP funds are distributed, thus adding more influence to the 
supranational regulatory powers of the EU.  
How the CAP Operates Today 
The CAP is currently a system of direct payments decoupled from production that are 
combined with funds given for rural development. The CAP is primarily focused with providing 
farmers with a secure, livable income with stimulating invest on and off the farm and in the 
community. The CAP is considered a living policy that can be reformed to fit the needs of the 
member states in the current period, but the policy has shown to be difficult to change because of 
the varying preferences of the individual member states within and outside the EU.111 The CAP 
has had many unintended consequences and has been implemented differently in each country.  
The CAP has become the policy it is today because of the influence of trade policy 
preferences. The two different approaches to trade policy formation, the society based approach 
and the state based approach, can explain how the preferences for the policy were formed in both 
the EU-15 states and the CEE-NMS. The state based approach explains infant-industry case 
which can be used to illustrate both the creation of the CAP in the wake of World War II and the 
strong desire for the formerly communist CEE-NMS to receive protection to jumpstart their 
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disadvantaged agricultural sectors. The society based approach can be shown to have influenced 
the development of the system of direct payments. The sector model demonstrates that industries 
compete along industry lines, so the direct payments given to the large, efficient farms that own 
most of the capital in the EU benefit both the owners and labor employed on the farms. The cost 
of the agricultural subsidy is carried by consumers who struggle with the collective action 
problem and competing industries who do not receive support from the EU. The theories of trade 
policy formation have influenced the preference formation and the changes in preference over 
time for the EU-15 states and the CEE-NMS.  
The varying preferences of the former EU-15 and the CEE-NMS have created a policy 
that is heavily debated as the EU-15 push for more environmentally conscious measures in the 
face of CEE-NMS preferences for increased investment in agricultural production. In the case of 
Poland, the CAP has been an extremely important policy that has influenced structural changes 
in farming and the agricultural sector. Since Poland has a unique history of partial 
collectivization under communist rule, the effects of the CAP have been different than the 
formerly fully collectivized states and states with a high percentage of family farms. Poland will 
be used as a case study to examine how the CAP interacts with a country that has a diverse 
agricultural sector.  
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The CAP and Poland 
 Poland is an interesting case in regards to the implementation of the CAP in the CEE-
NMS. Poland, like most other central and eastern European states, created a system of peasant 
farming in the aftermath of World War II, but only a decade passed until Soviet involvement 
created communist governments in many CEES. Poland, along with Yugoslavia, never actually 
completed the collectivization process, and a mixture of few, large state farms mixed with 
plentiful small, peasant farms combined to make a diverse agricultural sector that was unique for 
the states under Soviet influence.112 With the fall of communism in 1989 and the rise of Polish 
democracy, Poland looked longingly at access to the common market and policies of the EU. 
Poland, along with the other CEE-NMS, began making preparation for accession to the EU. 
After accession of the CEE-NMS in 2004, Poland received agricultural support measures from 
the CAP, and the CAP has had many effects on the development of Polish preferences, 
agricultural structure, competitiveness, and budgetary concerns. The influence that the EU-15 
members have had implementing their policy preferences into the CAP without Polish interests 
in mind has created many problems with the implementation of the CAP in the country, 
particularly the use of direct payment funds for consumption needs rather than for investment 
and the forced spending of these funds on environmental and rural development measures when 
they could be better used to stimulate further production.  
In Katarzyna Kosior’s article, “The Impact of Central and Eastern Europe on the 
Common Agricultural Policy”, the author analyzes the impact of the group of eastern European 
nations on the CAP and vice versa. In Poland, as in many other eastern European states, 
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ascension to the European Union meant access to the CAP. The reason why Poland is so 
attracted to gaining access to this specific policy is because of the size and scope of the 
agricultural sector. Farmers serve as a large percentage of the electorate and they have consistent 
proven their ability to communicate and organize collective action.113 Specifically in Poland, the 
Polish Peasant Party has been part of a governing coalition four times since 1989, despite 
lackluster success in the primary elections. Between 2005 and 2007, the nationalist Law and 
Justice party governed in a coalition with the populist Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland. 
Defending farmers is an important political concern across the spectrum of political parties not 
only in Poland, but in the other eastern European countries with significant percentages of their 
population employed in the agricultural sector.  
The preferences for the CAP displayed by eastern European countries are based on two 
underlying reasons: social welfare concerns pushed by political pressures and the desire to make 
agriculture more modern and competitive in the EU and international markets.114 Since Poland 
has a large number of subsistence and semi-subsistence farms, Poland along with other eastern 
European countries are less likely to desire targeted farm payments. This policy preference has 
been particularly evident in countries with small scale farming with the most notable example 
being Poland. The expectation is that the CAP will provide sufficient support for farming 
incomes and protection for the less successful farms. As a result of this expectation, the CAP has 
developed into an integral welfare state policy and an important supplement to domestic welfare 
policies.115 Since Poland is not as wealthy as the western European Union member states, its 
ability to support agriculture and rural life is more limited, and this external source of financing 
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agriculture is much needed. The changes at the national level since accession to the European 
Union are attention deserving. 
The CAP has obviously brought benefits to the new member states including Poland. 
Between 2005 and 2012, average incomes of eastern European farmers have increased by close 
to 60 percent.116 This development has come even though the eastern European member states 
have only been receiving a percentage of the support that the older member states enjoy. This 
increase is eye-opening, but the fact of the matter is that the original starting points for these 
countries were extremely low. Since the policy, the income distribution between farmers has 
been growing. The direct payments from the CAP are ending up mostly in the hands of the 
already largest and richest farmers. In Poland, this is not as much of an issue since large 
agricultural holdings do not dominate the character of the industry. The continuing high number 
of subsistence and near subsistence farms has illustrated that even this reduced amount of 
support from direct payments has been protecting these small farms.117 
Poland is one of the largest net beneficiaries of the CAP budget, and this favorable 
position has been evident in its preferences for the current budgetary period of 2014 to 2020. 
Poland has pushed heavily for the continued strength of the first pillar of the CAP, the system of 
direct payments to individual farmers.118 The eastern European member states are interested in 
recapturing their agricultural production potential since they lost around 15 to 30 percent of 
agricultural potential during their economic transformation post-communism. Since there is this 
lost potential, it has been unsurprising that Poland and other eastern European countries have 
opposed proposals of weakening market intervention methods or with the limiting the direct 
payment system. In addition to opposing plans to weaken the first pillar of the CAP, Poland has 
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pushed for maintaining the role of the second pillar and not expanding it. The second pillar of the 
CAP, rural development, requires national co-financing, and these poorer member states balk at 
that responsibility. The final position the eastern European countries took on the CAP was the 
system of basing direct payments on historical yields. This system favored the original member 
states because the direct payments were calculated using the quantities produced during the 
difficult times of economic transformation.119 The eastern European countries are at a 
disadvantage in the level of direct aid payments, and this system has created a discrepancy 
between older and newer member states. 
Poland has demonstrated specific attitudes on each of these issues. Poland is distinctly 
against renationalizing the budget of the CAP, and the country would like to see at least the 
maintenance of the current budget levels.120 Poland is also strongly against the system of 
historical distribution because the gap in production between the period used for the distribution 
and the level of production of Poland today is staggering. Poland is a strong supporter of market 
intervention policies, and they favor a protectionist approach in the sectors of beef, veal, pork, 
sugar and milk.121 In regards to the second pillar of the CAP, Poland believes the agro-food 
sector should be supported in additional environmental practices. Polish leaders also favor 
greater flexibility between the two pillars of the CAP, and they would like to use funds from the 
second pillar to provide greater direct payments to their farmers.122 Most of these attitudes are 
similar to other eastern European countries, but there are some minor differences since Poland is 
at a different stage of development as some of the other countries, notably the Czech Republic. 
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 In Hilary and Mark Ingham’s article, “How Big is the Problem of Polish Agriculture?,” 
the authors analyze the period before Poland’s ascension to the European Union and whether or 
not the Union and the nation are ready for such a merger. When Poland ascended to the 
European Union, there were many different aspects of its agricultural sector that created cause 
for concern. In 2004, the year of ascension, the nature of Poland’s agricultural sector was large 
and semi-subsistence. There was much structural inefficiency that was not addressed during the 
period of economic transformation. Agriculture was left relatively unchanged during this period. 
As Poland approached the time of their ascension to the European Union, stimulating agricultural 
restructuring and promoting rural development were thought to be high on Poland and the EU’s 
policy agendas. Their efforts at the time, however, were lackluster.123 Poland had several 
potential issues that needed to be addressed, particularly the structure of their agricultural sector. 
Since there is an inverse relationship between agricultural employment and growth that 
changes the process of economic development, and data that shows that Polish real gross GDP 
grew by 47.6 percent during the 1990s, it should be apparent that major farm restructuring 
occurred.124 This is not the case. The authors demonstrate that there was a 16% change in 
agricultural employment during the period 1988 to 2000, but it was due to the collapse of state 
farms. The private sector actually gained employees during this a period, a certain sign that 
agricultural restructuring did not take place. The size of the agricultural sector included 25% of 
Poland’s total population at this time as well.125 The number of farms in 2000 was recorded at 
1,992,000 private farms with 12.7 percent of these farms producing primarily for their own 
consumption. Another 37.4 percent of these farms produce primarily for their own needs, but 
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surpluses are sold on the local market. The combined percentages for these extensive styles of 
agriculture develop a picture of inefficiency in a large amount of farms throughout the country.  
With structural aspects of the agricultural sector in mind, Poland prepared to enter the 
European Union. Poland’s demands to the European Union were simple: it wanted full 
integration of the CAP, the inclusion of Polish agricultural goods in the single market, and the 
awarding of production quotas at the natural level of production for environment friendly 
production while ensuring maintenance of stable income sources for the agricultural 
population.126 The second two demands were accepted relatively easily, but there was a 
discrepancy between the wishes of the European Union member states and Poland. In the eyes of 
the European Union, the direct payments were a compensatory measure to member states that 
lost the price supports when the MacSharry reforms changed the nature of the CAP. The new 
member states should not receive these payments since they never originally enjoyed the price 
support measures.127 Poland and the other potential member states argued that these supports lost 
their compensatory nature after ten years, and the European Commission ultimately came to 
acknowledge this point. Also, since these direct payments were a part of the CAP, refusing to 
extend them to the new states would belittle the concept of a single, unified agricultural market. 
The compromise the two sides came to as Ingham and Ingham describe it “was that any 
candidate country accepted into membership would receive 25% of the full entitlement in 2004, 
30% in 2005, and 35% in 2006. After 2006, their payments would increase by ten percentage 
points each year until 2013, when the new members were to enjoy full support levels.”128 With 
this compromise, Poland accepted a ten year transitionary period before the CAP could be 
completely accessed.  
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The goal of this compromise in the eyes of the European Union was to limit the potential 
damage to Poland’s agricultural sector that a flood of large income payments would bring. The 
EU members wanted to slowly progress the Polish economy along without limiting restructuring. 
Also, a disproportionate income addition to a singular group of the economy was seen to 
potentially create income disparities and social distortions.129 The effects of the direct payments, 
however, would potentially have the effect of limiting agricultural restructuring regardless. 
Rising direct payments were seen as the means to stabilize agricultural incomes without 
damaging immediate restructuring and societal stability.  
 In Marek Wigier’s article, “The Competitiveness of Polish Agriculture after Accession to 
the EU”, the author analyzes how Poland’s agricultural sector has changed since accession to the 
European Union. As Ingham and Ingham introduced the structural problems that Poland faced 
leading up to its accession, Wigier attempts to determine if these issues have been addressed and 
to describe some of the problems for Poland’s agricultural sector on the horizon. Wigier makes 
the point that the changes in the agricultural sector in Poland seem to be the most significant 
change since 2004.130 The author uses the competitiveness and the efficiency of Polish farms to 
determine their economic health. The most important part of Wigier’s research for this analysis 
is his accounting of the structural changes in Polish agriculture since the accession to the 
European Union. 
The land resources of farms have changed significantly since Poland joined the EU. The 
total area of land has dropped by over one million hectares of agricultural land. This change can 
mostly be explained by the increased use of abandoned land for other industries and an overall 
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change in the area of grasslands.131 Another major structural change is the decrease in the overall 
number of farms by 22 percent since the accession to the European Union. Also, the distribution 
of the sizes of farms is changing as well. There has been a decrease of 20 percent in the number 
of farms less than one hectare in size and an increase in the number of farms over thirty hectares 
in size. Wigier ultimately concludes that these developments in agricultural structure are positive 
in nature as bigger farms are typically more efficient than their smaller counterparts.132  
Even though the author determines that Poland’s agricultural sector is moving in a better 
direction in terms of structure, he deduces that Polish agriculture is in a weak competitive 
position in regards to its competitive potential. He states, “In 2010, Polish agriculture had its 
disposal 8.5% of land resources, 18% of labor input, and 5.1% of capital input in the EU-27 
agricultural sector.”133 The relatively large amount of land and labor input dominate the lower 
percentage of capital input. Wigier points out that these percentages are not favorable to high 
levels of agricultural production. Also, Poland has a relatively small amount of land per 
agricultural work unit (AWU) when compared to the average of the other members of the 
European Union. This ratio was 7.7 hectares per AWU in Poland to 16.7 hectares per AWU 
which is the average of the other states.134  
Wigier ends his analysis with his conclusion where he states that even though Poland has 
improved since its accession to the European Union, it is still a state with mostly small farms and 
inefficiency across its agricultural sector. One of the main weaknesses of the Polish agricultural 
sector in terms of competitiveness is the concentration of most of the production potential in 
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farms with relatively small scales of production.135 Since there is weakness in most of the farms 
in the Poland, this weakness translates to a relatively disadvantage for Poland in the European 
single market. The CAP has helped stabilize the incomes of farmers in Poland, but Wigier says 
that there needs to be more progress in terms of structural changes in Polish agriculture. He also 
makes the statement that Polish agriculture has improved since ascension to the European Union, 
but Polish goods are still unprepared for open competition on the international markets since 
there are many similar agricultural producers in the world who do not hold the same positional 
strength that Poland does with the European common market.136  
Projections for the future are also interested in whether Poland will be able to generate 
more productivity and efficiency from its agricultural sector. In an article by Czyzewski and 
Stepien, “Budget of the EU and Common Agricultural Policy for 2014-2020 in the Light of 
Polish Interests,” the two authors examine the negotiations over the new EU budget and the 
structure of the CAP. Most of their findings are mirrored in Dora’s and Grzelak article, 
“Conditions for the Development of Polish Agriculture in the Context of Globalization and 
European Integration,” the authors introduce several future influences on Polish agriculture and 
how they may affect the sector. The goal of their analysis is to determine whether funds allocated 
to Poland in the European Union budget for the period 2014 to 2020, changes in the CAP, and 
increased demand for food in developing countries will have a positive impact on the 
competitiveness on Polish agriculture in the future.  
According to the authors, the EU budget only is 1 percent of Europe’s combined GNI, so 
the EU budget in relation to national wealth is small. The EU budget allots 105.8 billion Euros to 
Poland during the period, and 28.5 billion of these Euros will be used in the Polish agricultural 
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sector.137 In regards to the CAP, Pillar 1 of the CAP will receive 29 percent of the total European 
Union budget, and Pillar 2 will receive 9 percent of the total budget. As Czyzewski & Stepien 
have noted, however, is that the percentage of the budget allotted to the CAP is falling while the 
percentage allotted to the cohesion policy is rising.138 With the reforms of the CAP in 2013, these 
funds will go towards addressing the global challenges surrounding agriculture, namely food 
security, climate change, sustainable economic growth, and rural development. In terms of Polish 
interests, the country managed to extend the simplified system of subsidies for the new member 
states until 2020 and to maintain partial national farm aid. The amount of subsidies given to new 
member states, however, will still not be equal to the amount given to older member states.139  
The amount of aid given to Poland through the CAP for this period of 2014 to 2020 will 
nominally increase over the period of 2007-2013. Poland will also be the biggest net beneficiary 
of the Pillar 2 aspect of the CAP.140 Poland will also be the sixth biggest receiver of the direct 
payments under the first pillar of the CAP. As the budget and the CAP show, Poland is a country 
of emphasis for the European Union as development in Poland is crucial to the agricultural 
success of the EU as a whole. All indications point to this budget allotment being the last project 
of its kind, and hopefully a more liberal market will be in place by the year 2020.141  
There are some interesting dimensions to the budget allotment and the reforms of the 
CAP. Since this is the last budget allotment of this kind, it is imperative that the funds are spent 
in a cautious and deliberate manner. Also, since the first pillar of the CAP is aimed at protecting 
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the small farmer, this inhibits the development of the best farms. 142 The authors argue that direct 
payments are used in an efficient manner, serving as part of the fight against rural poverty and 
not for development of agricultural holdings. Also, the greening aspect of the CAP requires 
farms to grow at least three different crops which limit the overall production of individual farms 
by increasing production costs.143  
The authors also state that the liberalization of trade creates many risks to Polish 
agriculture, even as developing nations demand more and more food. EU agricultural products, 
including Polish products, are typically more expensive and not as competitive on the global 
market. The authors state that “the European model of agriculture may not survive in the era of a 
globalizing economy dominated by openness, liberalism, and all-encompassing flows of capital, 
goods, and information.144 These projections require massive changes on the part of Polish 
farmers, and it’s imperative to isolate and analyze the CAP’s role in the vulnerability of Polish 
agriculture to foreign competition.  
Poland’s policy preferences are slightly different from the other CEE-NMS because of its 
unique agricultural diversity and its place among one of the stronger agricultural producers in the 
EU, but its preferences are much more similar to other CEE-NMS than the preferences of the 
original EU-15 states. Rather than being focused on the implementation of sustainable 
agricultural practices and forms of environmental protection, Poland is more interesting in using 
CAP funds to stimulate agricultural production in its still developing agricultural sector.145 
Poland shares many similarities in terms of preferences with Romania because both countries 
have extremely high numbers of workers employed in agriculture with many small farms. 
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Another manifestation of Polish agricultural diversity creating policy preferences is that the large 
number of small farms and farmers creates a preference for capping the direct payments that 
large farms can receive.146 This helps protect the interests of the small farmer by disadvantaging 
the larger, less plentiful farms in Poland. As outlined in the state-based approach to trade policy 
formation, Poland is interested in protectionist measures to continue to help their small farms 
develop. Poland’s agricultural sector is still underdeveloped when compared to the large, 
efficient farms in the EU-15 and the former collective farms in CEE-NMS such as Hungary or 
the Czech Republic. The society-based approach demonstrates how Polish farmers have banded 
together politically through political parties such as the Polish People’s Party, an agrarian party 
that looks to slow privatization of agriculture and to continue with interventionist measures in 
agriculture, to push for protectionist measures in the CAP.147 The CAP has had many interesting 
effects on Polish policy formation, and the unique structure of Poland creates a preference 
structure that shares similarities and differences between other CEE-NMS while being 
considerably different from the more environmentally and rural development oriented 
preferences of the former EU-15 states.  
 Polish preferences for the CAP have not always been included in the reforms of the CAP 
in the years leading up to Poland’s accession to the European Union, and this lack of preference 
representation has created negative effects in Polish agriculture. The disparity in the funds 
received by the EU-15 and the CEE-NMS, including Poland, led to the separation of the two 
sides of the policy into the privileged and the disadvantaged. As time has gone on, the CEE-
NMS have begun to receive more support from the CAP, but the distortions between the two 
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sides still remain today to a lesser extent.148 There are two particular negative consequences from 
the failure of the EU-15 to include the preferences of Poland and CEE-NMS in the reforms of the 
CAP: the failure of the system of direct payments to encourage investment in agriculture and the 
increasing financial commitments of CAP to rural development and sustainability measures in 
the still developing CEE-NMS agricultural sectors.  
One of the biggest negative consequences of the implementation of a CAP unattached 
from Poland’s policy preferences is how Polish farmers use the direct payments. The EU-15 
states pushed for the implementation of direct payments in order to limit the rising cost of the 
CAP associated with extending price-supporting measures to the CEE-NMS. 149The rationale 
behind the direct payments was that the additional income could be used to increase investment 
in farming capital. This logic works well in the EU-15 where farmers have incomes that can 
support their family without the direct payments. Then, these payments could be invested 
directly into the farm through diversification or purchasing capital.150 In the still developing 
CEE-NMS, the direct payments became a vital addition to income used for consumption. Instead 
of encouraging further investment in farms, the direct payments became a support measure that 
kept uncompetitive farms in the agricultural sector, thus limiting agricultural restricting and 
enforcing the status quo, the disparities between the EU-15 and the CEE-NMS, in Poland and the 
CEE-NMS.  
The second negative consequence is the forcing of CEE-NMS to comply with rural 
development and environmental regulations associated with receiving direct payments for the 
CAP. Poland prefers to have greater flexibility to transfer funds reserved for rural development 
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to farm-intensive support measures.151 Forcing these developing CEE-NMS to develop 
agriculturally sustainable farming when they are already disadvantaged in terms of production 
when compared to the EU-15 states. The advanced EU-15 states can afford to consider rural 
development and agriculturally sustainable farming measures as imperative to the CAP, but the 
CEE-NMS are more focused with stimulating development directly in agriculture. Most of the 
CEE-NMS, including Poland, are against the further greening of the direct payments, and most 
support continued protectionist policies.152 Rather than being able to pump as much funds as 
possible into farming to stimulate production and catch up to the EU-15 states, the CEE-NMS 
are forced to apply these funds in way that do not match their policy preferences. This forced 
misuse of funds further delays the process of the CEE-NMS closing the gap between the 
production of their agricultural sectors and the sectors of the EU-15. These two negative 
consequences of the CAP have created problems in the CEE-NMS that could have been avoided 
if the CEE-NMS had more of a say in the negotiations of CAP reforms.  
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Conclusions 
 With the creation of the European Union, one of the world’s first experiments with a 
powerful, supranational organization began. The Common Agricultural Policy has served as one 
of the backbones of the Union, subsidizing and protecting agriculture in the continent for 
decades. The policy is not perfect, however, and it has had to be reformed and changed many 
times as the preferences of member states and acceding states began to influence or change the 
policy. After a lengthy period as a price-supporting agricultural policy, the CAP had to be 
changed in the face of the accession of the former communist states of central and eastern 
Europe.153 If these states were to access under the price-supporting subsidies of the CAP prior to 
the MacSharry reforms, the cost of the CAP would have had dire consequences for large 
contributors such as Germany and the United Kingdom, thus leading to the reform of the policy 
leading up to accession of these states. The EU-15 took advantage of the opportunity to 
implement their preferences for the CAP without accommodating the preferences of the CEE-
NMS such as Poland that would be affected by the implementation of this policy. The reform of 
the CAP has had negative consequences for the development of agriculture in the CEE-NMS, 
and the future of the CAP is going to heavily reflect the preferences of these states after their 
successful negotiation for less disparity in direct payments between the former EU-15 and 
themselves during the 2013 reforms of the CAP.154  
 Negotiations over the 2013 reforms of the CAP were particularly interested in how the 
CAP would change in the future. With the changes forces of globalization and increased 
competition on international markets from established powers such as the United States or 
developing future agricultural powers such as Brazil or India, the EU is heavily concerned with 
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protecting its agricultural interests. The hard part for the EU was determining what stance the 
Union as a whole would take in regards to the CAP and its reform. Negotiations over the CAP 
required over two years of intense discussions because of the disparities in preferences of the 
richer, former EU-15 states and the poorer, developing CEE-NMS states.155 For all the 
possibilities of how reform would manifest for the future period of 2014 to 2020, there were 
three options for the EU: the maintaining of the current level of expenditures, the strengthening 
of the CAP budget, or reduction of support under the CAP and the renationalization of some 
aspects of the policy.156 The negotiated budget ultimately combined the first two options while 
heavily rejecting the idea of renationalization agricultural policy in the EU, thus demonstrating 
the newfound political importance of the poorer CEE-NMS in the negotiation process of the 
reforms. 
 The CEE-NMS were not able to secure their ultimate goal of the equalization of direct 
payments between the former EU-15 states and the CEE-NMS, but they did manage to secure the 
gradual reduction of the disparity between the two groups. Also, Poland in particular pushed 
heavily for the continuation of the SAPS program for the period until 2020, allowing the poorer 
CEE-NMS to continue to use the simplified approach to direct payments.157 A final concession 
received by the CEE-NMS is that the greening qualification and rules to environmental 
investment will not apply to farms under 10 hectares in size, a welcome policy in both Poland 
and Romania where large numbers of semi-subsistence farms are prevalent.158 These concessions 
were important because the CEE-NMS needed to receive policies that matched their preferences 
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in order to accept the increased percentage of direct payments funds allocated for greening 
measures and the expansion of the CAP funds directed towards rural development.  
 The reforms of the CAP in 2013 are in preparation for the ultimate liberalization of the 
EU agriculture as the process of globalization increases. Since Poland has had a unique history of 
agricultural diversity, its preferences differ slightly from other CEE-NMS because Poland has a 
large number of small farms mixed with a few large ones, a structure similar to Romania but 
different from CEE-NMS such as the Czech Republic that underwent a large collectivization 
under communist control.159 Poland’s agricultural sector is still poor and underdeveloped when 
compared to the more efficient farms in the former EU-15, so this last period of CAP 
predominance as a supranational source of agricultural protectionism is imperative to the 
preparation of Polish and CEE-NMS agriculture for competition in a liberal market. The funds 
allocated to Poland the CEE-NMS will be the last on such grand a scale, so how these funds are 
used could determine if the CEE-NMS and Poland are able to compete in the global market 
without substantial protection from the EU.160  
The CAP has affected the CEE-NMS in many ways, some intended and some 
unintended, because the CAP is a policy that has undergone many changes over the decades as 
the demands of the member states have changed and competed with each other. Understanding 
the changes in the CAP over time is important to understanding the policy as it stands today, the 
manifestation of the EU-15 controlling the reforms of the policy as the CEE-NMS could not 
impress their preferences on the policy. Only in the reforms of 2013 have the CEE-NMS and 
particularly Poland been able to negotiate their preferences into the policy. The CAP has 
influenced Polish agriculture in two particular negative ways by encouraging the continuation of 
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the status quo by forcing Polish farmers to be dependent on the system of direct payments to 
survive rather than investing the funds on their farms and by forcing Polish farmers to develop 
rural development plans and sustainable farming rather than applying these funds to farming-
intensive activities that could close the gap between production in the EU-15 and the CEE-NMS.   
The shaping of Polish preferences towards increased protectionism, the rejection of the 
renationalization of the policy, and the disinterest in environmental concerns in favor of 
increased production demonstrates the needs of the country, and the opportunity for Poland to 
influence the further development of the CAP is a key opportunity to right some of the wrongs 
imposed by the EU-15 through the CAP. The future of the CAP looks grim as the policy does not 
have a strong place in an increasingly interconnected world that requires increased liberalization 
as multilateral trade agreements are put in place. Negotiations for further liberalization of 
agriculture between the United States and the EU are occurring today, and new developing 
countries such as Brazil and India are now at the negotiation table pushing for liberalization as 
well.161 The pressures on the CAP will prove to be the deciding factors in weakening the policy 
at the end of the 2020 period, the end of a decades long era of protectionist dominance in Europe. 
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